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INTRODUCTION
Aliquidated damages provision is a stipulation in acontract for a fixed sum to be paid as damages forbreach of the contract. The purposes served by the
liquidated damages provision are that the damages payable
by the contract breaker (eg a contractor in delay) are
limited and the innocent party (eg an employer who
receives late completion) does not have to prove strictly his
losses. Of commercial importance, the provision provides
certainty for both parties enabling them to assess and price
the risks associated with delay.
The fixed sum may be an identified amount of money or
a sum ascertainable by a formula (eg £x per week). The
fixed sum may apply in the event of one or more different
types of breach and cover one or more different types of
damage. There may be a number of separate provisions for
liquidated damages in one contract.
IS THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISION
AN EXHAUSTIVE REMEDY?
Any liquidated damages provision has to be construed in
the context of the contract in question as a matter of
contractual interpretation. It is always open to the parties
to agree expressly that any liquidated damages will or will
not constitute an exhaustive remedy for the relevant
breach. In the absence of such express agreement, for most
building and engineering contracts the starting point is that
it operates as an exhaustive remedy for damages for late
completion (Cellulose Acetate v Widnes Foundry [1933] AC 20
(HL); Diestal v Stevenson [1906] 2 KB 345 (KBD)).
In Temloc v Erill Properties (1987) 39 BLR 30 (CA) Nourse
LJ described the liquidated damages provision in the 1980
JCT Standard Form of Building Contract as:
“an exhaustive agreement as to the damages which are or are
not to be payable by the contractor in the event of his failure
to complete the works on time.”
A different position appears to be taken in the case of
charterparties where the courts have permitted the
recovery of general damages in addition to liquidated
damages. In Aktieselskabet Reidarv v Arcos Ltd [1927] 1 KB
352 (CA) the Court of Appeal allowed a claim for damages
for dead freight as a result of a failure to load the cargo at
the stipulated rate in addition to agreed demurrage for
delay. The Judges allowed the claim on different grounds.
Bankes LJ justified the decision by identifying two
separate breaches, namely (i) the failure to complete
loading within the stipulated time for which demurrage
was paid and (ii) the failure to load at an agreed rate for
which damages were recoverable (p.362):
“Upon the special facts of this case the plaintiffs’ claim
appears to me to be … essentially distinct from any claim for
detention of the vessel. In substance what the plaintiffs are
saying is that if the charterers had loaded the goods at the
agreed rate they would have earned freight on 850 standards,
whereas owing to the failure to load at that rate they could
only earn freight on 544 standards, and that their loss
directly flowing from the breach of contract is the difference
between the amount of freight which they would have earned
and the amount which they in fact earned. This loss is, in my
opinion, on the facts of this case recoverable as damages for
the breach of contract to load at the agreed rate.”
Atkin LJ appeared to allow the additional damages on
the ground that there was one breach of contract with two
parts, namely, (i) a failure to load a cargo within the
stipulated time and (ii) a failure to load a full and complete
cargo, and two separate heads of loss p.363:
“The result of the authorities appears to be that in a contract
fixing a number of lay days and providing for days at
demurrage thereafter, the charterer enters into a binding
obligation to load a complete cargo within the lay days
subject to any default by the shipowner … If the lay days
expire without a full cargo having been loaded the charterer
has broken his contract. The provisions as to demurrage
quantify the damages, not for the complete breach, but only
such damages as arise from the detention of the vessel...”
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The reference to an incomplete breach is surprising and
not satisfactory. It is suggested that a better explanation for
Atkins LJ’s decision is that there were two distinct
breaches: breach of the obligation to load the cargo within
the stipulated time, giving rise to the agreed demurrage;
and breach of the obligation to load a full and complete
cargo, giving rise to damages.
Sargant LJ based his decision on the ground that there
were two separate breaches, each giving rise to a separate
right to damages:
“On the footing then that clause 3 of the charterparty fixes
the damages for the detention of the ship at 25l. a day, does
the payment of a sum calculated on this basis form an agreed
compensation for the loss which the owners have sustained in
the circumstances of this case? I cannot think so. The loss
inflicted on the owners and claimed by them is loss of another
character – namely, loss of freight caused by the breach by the
charterers of their contract to load a full and complete cargo
as prescribed by clause 1 of the charterparty. The obligation of
clause 1 is, in my judgment, rightly described by the learned
judge as the primary obligation. The object of the second
sentence of clause 3 is to provide compensation for a detention
of the vessel in the course of fulfilling this primary obligation,
not to give compensation for the breach of the primary
obligation itself. No doubt the same delay in loading, which
might give rise to a claim for detention, also resulted in a
breach of the obligation to load a full cargo, but the breach of
this latter obligation caused a definite separate loss
independent of and largely exceeding any loss arising from
mere detention.”
This case was considered by Webster J in Total Transport
v Amoco Trading (“The Altus”) [1985] 1 Ll.Rep. 423 (Com.Ct),
in which the owners of a vessel recovered damages for the
charterers’ failure to load the minimum stipulated cargo in
addition to demurrage for delay. Having referred to the
judgments in The Arcos Webster J stated at p 435:
“… it seems to me that I must treat the ratio decidendi of
the case as being that where a charterer commits any breach,
even if it is only one breach, of his obligation either to provide
the minimum contractual load or to detain the vessel for no
longer than the stipulated period, the owner is entitled not
only to the liquidated damages directly recoverable for that
breach of the obligation to load (deadfreight) or for the
breach of the obligation with regard to detention
(demurrage), but also for, in the first case, to the damages
flowing indirectly or consequentially from any detention of the
vessel (if it occurs) and, in the second case, to damages
flowing indirectly or consequentially from any failure to load a
complete cargo if there is such a failure.”
To the extent that this case is authority for the
proposition that general damages are recoverable in
addition to liquidated damages for the same breach, it is
based on an understandably mistaken analysis of Arcos. The
charterparty cases can be explained as cases where more
than one breach occurred and the loss claimed fell outside
the ambit of the liquidated damages provision as a matter
of construction. Reading the construction and the
charterparty cases together, the position appears to be:
(1) each liquidated damages clause has to be construed in
order to identify what breach and loss it is intended to
cover;
(2) generally, the liquidated damages clause will be held to
be an exhaustive remedy for that identified breach and loss;
(3) additional damages are recoverable provided that a
separate breach and separate head of loss can be
established.
GROUNDS ON WHICH LIQUIDATED
DAMAGES CAN BE CHALLENGED
The grounds on which liquidated damages can be
challenged can be summarised as follows:
(1) On a true construction of the provision, it is not
applicable to the event that has occurred (eg no breach
or different breach).
(2) There is a condition precedent to the applicability of
the liquidated damages provision (eg a certificate of
non-completion) that has not been satisfied.
(3) The provision is invalid or void for uncertainty.
(4) The material contractual machinery is inoperable or
has broken down.
(5) The provision is a penalty.
The first two grounds are relatively straightforward as
matters of construction but the other grounds have given
rise to difficulties in application.
Invalid or void for uncertainty
If, on a true construction, the liquidated damages
provision does not make sense and cannot be made to
make sense, or is too uncertain, it will not be enforced. In
Bramall & Ogden Ltd v Sheffield City Council (1983) 29 BLR 73
(OR) the JCT Contract (1963 Edition, July 1973 Revision)
provided for the contractor to construct 123 dwellings and
associated works. The rate for liquidated damages in the
Appendix was expressed as “at the rate of £20 per week for
each uncompleted dwelling”.
There was no provision for sectional completion but as
houses were completed they were taken over by the
employer by consent. Clause 16(e) provided that where
parts of the works were taken into possession by consent,
the sum to be paid or allowed as liquidated damages should
be proportionately reduced on the basis of the value of the
occupied part relative to the full contract sum. The court
(OR, now TCC) held that the employer was not entitled to
deduct liquidated damages. The provision was held to be
inoperable (“one cannot operate the Appendix and Condition
16(e)..”) because of the inconsistency between clause 16(e)
and the Appendix in that the calculation required in clause 21
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16(e) could not be carried out by reference to a rate per
uncompleted dwelling rather than a specific rate for the
whole of the works.
The decision was referred to with approval in Arnhold &
Co v A-GEAES of Hong Kong (1989) 47 BLR 129 (H Ct HK)
where a liquidated damages provision expressed as a range
of figures (without machinery to determine the precise
figure) was held to be void for uncertainty.
However, a liquidated damages provision will not be
held to be invalid merely because it is difficult to construe.
The courts are reluctant to hold that a provision in a
commercial contract is void for uncertainty or otherwise
inoperable and, if the intention of the parties can
reasonably be discerned from the contract and any
admissible factual background, the court will give effect to
that intention even where that involves departing from or
qualifying the particular words used. (See Robophone
Facilities Ltd v Blank [1966] 1 WLR 1428; Philips Hong Kong
Ltd v AG- Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41 (PC); Investors
Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society
[1998] 1 WLR 896 (HL).
It is only where the provision is unworkable or too
uncertain to ascertain what the parties intended that the
courts will declare it to be invalid and unenforceable.
Machinery inoperable or breaks down
In construction contracts, a liquidated damages
provision is usually inserted in respect of damages caused
by delay in completing the works. The employer’s ability to
rely on such provision is lost if the employer prevents the
contractor from completing by the completion date
without any effective mechanism for extending time for
completion. Such failure arises where:
(1) the extension of time clause does not entitle the contractor
to an extension for the event that has occurred and the
event is the responsibility of the employer;
(2) the extension of time clause cannot be operated
effectively, eg through unfortunate drafting; or
(3) the machinery for determining extensions of time
breaks down, eg where the parties have agreed a
procedure that is not operated.
If the employer causes delay and there is no effective
mechanism for awarding an extension of time to the
contractor for such delay, the contractor is relieved of his
obligation to complete by the contractual completion date
(or any extended contractual date for completion) and
time is at large: Wells v Army & Navy Co-operative Society
(1903) CLY 1998-1999 65 (CA); Holme v Guppy (1838) 3
M&W 387; Amalgamated Building Contractors Ltd v Waltham
Holy Cross UDC [1952] 2 All ER 452 (CA); Peak Construction
(Liverpool) Ltd v McKinney Foundations Ltd (1970) 1 BLR 111
(CA); Dodd v Churton [1897] 1 QB 562 (CA).
Penalty
If a liquidated damages provision is a penalty, it will not
be enforced. The basis on which a penalty will not be
enforced by the courts is that it is unconscionable. The test
as to whether a clause constitutes a liquidated damages
provision or a penalty was set out by Lord Dunedin in
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co
[1915] AC 79, p 86 and can be summarised as follows:
(1) The fact that the parties have labelled a clause
“liquidated damages” or “penalty” is not conclusive.
(2) The essence of a penalty is a payment of money
stipulated as in terrorem of the offending party. The
essence of liquidated damages is a genuine pre-estimate
of damage.
(3) The question of whether a provision amounts to a
penalty or liquidated damages is a question of
construction in all the circumstances of the case.
Examples of the circumstances in which a court is likely
to hold that the provision is a penalty are:
(1) the sum stipulated is greater than the greatest loss that
could conceivably be proved;
(2) the breach in question is the non-payment of a sum and
the penalty is a greater sum;
(3) a lump sum is stipulated for a number of events that are
likely to give rise to different levels of damages.
A provision will not be held to be a penalty just because
it is difficult to make a pre-estimate of the loss likely to be
suffered in the event of a breach. Indeed, such difficulty is
often the commercial justification for agreed liquidated
damages. The courts are slow to hold that a liquidated
damages provision is a penalty where there is credible
evidence that a genuine assessment has been made (Impresa
Castelli SpA v Cola Holdings Ltd 87 Con LR 123 (TCC); City
Inn v Shepherd Construction Ltd [2003] BLR 468 (Ct Sess.).
However, they will not shy away from striking down
provisions that are shown to be penal in nature, such as an
extortionate rate of interest (Jeancharm Ltd v Barnet Football
Club Ltd (2003) CILL 1987).
GENERAL DAMAGES IF LIQUIDATED
DAMAGES UNENFORCEABLE
An employer is entitled to claim general damages for
delay in the absence of any valid liquidated damages
provision. There is no direct authority on the question
whether the employer’s entitlement to general damages is
limited to the unenforceable liquidated damages provision.
The question was expressly left open in Cellulose Acetate Silk
Co Ltd v Widnes Foundry [1933] AC 20 (HL) per Lord Atkin
p 26 and in Rapid Building v Ealing Family Housing (1984) 29
BLR 1 (CA).
In charterparty cases, it seems clear that the courts will
disregard a penalty clause and permit the innocent party to
recover its actual loss, whether more or less than the sum
stipulated in the penalty clause: Wall v Rederiaktiebolaget
Luggude [1915] 3 KB 66 (KBD); Watts v Mitsui [1917] AC
227 (HL). However, it does not follow that the Court’s
approach to penalty clauses in those charterparty cases will22
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be adopted in other cases. In Widnes Foundry v Cellulose
Acetate Silk Co [1931] 2 KB (CA) (upheld on appeal to HL)
Scrutton LJ referred to Wall and Watts at p 408:
“Lord Sumner went further, and said that the clause did not
prevent the shipowner or charterer from recovering the actual
amount of damage, though it might be more than the
estimated amount of freight. That in my view turned largely
upon the fact that there was one clause purporting to fix one
damage for every sort of breach.”
In Robophone v Blank (supra), a case in which the Court of
Appeal held that a liquidated damages provision was not a
penalty, Diplock LJ raised the question but expressly did
not answer it:
“Where the court refuses to enforce a ‘penalty clause’ of this
nature, the injured party is relegated to his right to claim
that lesser measure of damages to which he would have been
entitled at common law for the breach actually committed if
there had been no penalty clause in the contract….I make no
attempt, where so many others have failed, to rationalise this
common law rule… it is by no means clear that ‘penalty
clauses’ are simply void, like covenants in unreasonable
restraint of trade. There are dicta either way, and in
Cellulose Acetate Silk v Widnes Foundry Lord Atkin
expressedly left open the question whether a penalty clause in
a contract, which fixed a single sum as payable upon breach
of a number of different terms of the contract, some of which
breaches may occasion only trifling damage but others damage
greater than the stipulated sum, would be treated as imposing
a limit on the damages recoverable in an action for a breach
in respect of which it operated to reduce the damages which
would otherwise be recoverable at common law…”
This decision was treated incorrectly as authority for the
proposition that general damages recovered could be greater
than the amount stipulated in the penalty clause in W&J
Investments Ltd v Bunting (1984) NSWLR 331 pp 335–6.
Dicta in Elsley v Collins (1978) 83 DLR 1 (Sup Ct
Canada) indicated that where a liquidated damages
provision was a penalty, the party seeking general damages
should be limited to recovery of the agreed sum in the
liquidated damages clause but that has been explained as a
reference to a limitation of liability clause as opposed to a
liquidated damages clause.
In Jobson v Johnson [1989] 1 All ER 621 (CA) the plaintiff
accepted the decision of Harman J at first instance that a
clause requiring the re-transfer of shares to the plaintiff at
a fixed sum in the event of a default in payments
constituted a penalty. The question for the court was
whether and on what basis the plaintiff should be entitled
to enforce the clause given that the shares could be worth
more or less than the plaintiff ’s actual loss and the
defendant’s counterclaim for relief had been struck out.
Dillon LJ considered the attitude of the courts to penalty
clauses and referred to section 8 of the Administration of
Justice Act 1696 at p 627:
“ The procedure under the section was that the plaintiff might
sign judgment for the full amount of the penalty claimed, but
he could not enforce the judgment by execution or otherwise
without assigning or alleging the breaches of the agreement
on which he relied and proving his damage from those
breaches, and he could only enforce the judgment to the
extent of the damage so proved… the plaintiff could not levy
a default judgment for the full amount of a penalty without
going to a jury to prove his actual loss.”
And Nicholls LJ stated at p 633:
“Although in practice a penalty clause in a contract as
described above is effectively a dead letter, it is important in
the present case to note that, contrary to the submissions of
counsel for the defendant, the strict legal position is not that
such a clause is simply struck out of the contract, as though
with a blue pencil, so that the contract takes effect as if it had
never been included therein. Strictly, the legal position is that
the clause remains in the contract and can be sued on, but it
will not be enforced by the court beyond the sum which
represents, in the events which have happened, the actual loss
of the party seeking payment.”
Taking into account the above authorities, the position
seems to be that a distinction can be drawn between those
cases in which the liquidated damages provision is struck
out of the contract (and therefore the contract should be
read without any reference to the clause) and those cases
in which the liquidated damages provision remains part of
the contract but is unenforceable:
(1) If a liquidated damages clause is a penalty, the clause
remains part of the contract and an employer will be
entitled to claim general damages subject to a cap at the
level of damages stipulated in the contract.
(2) There are differing views on whether a liquidated
damages clause is an exhaustive remedy. It is probably a
matter of construction of each contract. The shipping
cases can be explained on the basis that the additional
damages were for different types of breach and,
historically, the provisions have not been treated by the
parties as providing an exclusive remedy.
(3) If a liquidated damages clause fails because it is
inoperable or is void for uncertainty, it falls from the
contract and the employer’s entitlement to general
damages will not be subject to a cap.
(4) If a liquidated damages clause fails as a result of an act
of prevention by the employer, it is likely that the
Courts would permit recovery of general damages but
subject to the cap of the stipulated damages. The clause
remains part of the contract but cannot be relied on by
the employer because of the act of prevention. (There
is no direct authority on this matter but this view is
supported by Hudson (11th Ed), paras 10-024–10-042
and Keating (7th Ed), para 9–33).
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